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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Military Law-Courts-Martial Jurisdiction of United States
Civilians in Vietnam"
As the United States' involvement in Vietnam increased in the 1960's,
the government found it necessary to deploy an increasingly large number
of United States civilians to support our combat troops there. In a recent
case, United States v. Averette,' the United States Court of Military
Appeals2 was directly presented with the question of whether these
civilians are amenable to trial by court-martial for crimes committed in
Vietnam.
Averette, a civilian employee of an army contractor in Vietnam, was
a mobile equipment supervisor in charge of a motor pool at Camp Davies.'
This job, which required Averette to work almost exclusively with active
army personnel, entailed providing maintenance for all vehicles and
equipment in the army motor pool at Saigon, keeping logbooks, and
dispatching military vehicles.4 These vehicles were used at five different
army installations in Vietnam for repair and utility work and thus were
in direct support of the war effort.5 Additionally, Averette was closely
integrated into the army life at Camp Davies in that "[h] e had access to
a variety of Army facilities and benefits including the post exchange, the
commissary, banking privileges, and other welfare and recreational
activities.""
A general court-martial convicted Averette of conspiracy to commit
larceny and attempted larceny of 36,000 Government-owned batteries.7
The conspiracy involved military personnel with whom Averette was
associated.8 Appealing to the Court of Military Appeals, Averette
successfully challenged the validity of the Army's jurisdiction by con-
tending that since Congress had not formally declared war, the Vietnamese
conflict did not constitute "a time of war" as required by article 2 (10)9 of
-19 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970) (2-1 decision).
' Consisting of three civilian judges who hear appeals from all of the services, the
Court of Military Appeals is the highest appellate court in the military judicial
system. 10 U.S.C. § 867 (Supp. V, 1970).
'Averette v. Dillon, Civil No. L-863 (D. Kan., filed Jul. 24, 1969).
'Id. This intimate connection between Averette's employment and the military
was not mentioned in the opinion of the Court of Military Appeals.
'Id. (not mentioned by the Court of Military Appeals).
8 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 365, 41 C.M.R. at-.
Id. at 363, 41 C.M.R. at-.
8 Averette v. Dillon, Civil No. L-863 (D. Kan., filed Jul. 24, 1969) (not men-
tioned by the Court of Military Appeals).9UCMJ art. 2(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964) provides: "In time of war,
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the Uniform Code of Military Justice.10
Before considering the validity of this contention and the effect of
the court's acceptance of it, it is imperative to first consider the historical
development of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in general, and
of article 2 (10) specifically. The basis of American court-martial jurisdic-
tion over civilians can be directly traced to a provision of the British
Articles of War of 1765 which provided that "[a] 11 Suttlers and Retainers
to a Camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with Our Armies in the
Field, though no inlisted Soldiers, are to be subject to the Rules and
Discipline of War."'1 In 1775 the Continental Congress enacted into
the American Articles of War' 2 a strikingly similar provision, which was
thereafter included without substantial change in each revision of the
Articles of War up to and including the Articles of War of 1874."8
The first significant change came with the enactment of article 2 (d) 14
of the Articles of War of 1916, which for the first time expanded military
jurisdiction to encompass civilians who accompanied the armed forces out-
side the territorial limits of the United States in time of peace. 5 It was
contended that such jurisdiction was a constitutionally valid exercise of
Congress' power "[t] o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces."' 6 Congress' power to establish military
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field [are subject to
trial by court-martial]."
10 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
"British Articles of War of 1765 section XIV, article XXIII. Reprinted in
W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAV AND PRECEDENTS app. VII, at 941 (2d ed. reprint
1920) [hereinafter cited as WINTHROP].
1' The Articles of War were statutory provisions enacted by Congress in further-
ance of military administration and discipline. Although the original Articles of
War predate the Constitution, the later Articles were enacted under Congress'
article I legislative power "[rto make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces" and its broader "war powers," which can be found
scattered throughout article I, section 8 of the Constitution.8 The various articles mentioned are reprinted in WINTHROP apps. VII-XIII
941-91.
"'Article of War 2(d), Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1, 39 Stat. 651 provided
for jurisdiction over:
All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with
the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, and in time of war all such retainers and persons accompany-
ing or serving with the armies of the United States in the field, both within
and without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, though, not
otherwise subject to these articles.
" F. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE 227-31 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as WIENER].
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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courts independent of article III judicial power 7 and to make civilians
amenable to these courts during wartime had not been seriously ques-
tioned. Apparently it was assumed that this power could be extended
to make certain civilians amenable to courts-martial during peacetime.
At any rate article 2(d) remained unchanged in the two subsequent
revisions' of the Articles of War, and substantially the same provision
was enacted into the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950."° The
traditional wartime jurisdictional provision can be found in article 2(10)
of the Uniform Code,20 while the peacetime extension of 1916 is set forth
in article 2 (11) .2
Shortly after the Uniform Code was enacted, the Supreme Court
began to look with disfavor upon any expansion of court-martial jurisdic-
tion. This attitude, stemming largely from the fact that certain constitu-
tional safeguards inherent in article III courts are not constitutionally
required of military courts,2 2 culminated in a series of Supreme Court
holdings unconditionally striking down court-martial jurisdiction over
civilians in time of peace.2 Consequently, for all practical purposes, juris-
Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
'
8 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, Title II. § 202, 62 Stat. 628, and Act of June 4,
1920, ch. 227, subch. II, § 1, 41 Stat. 787.9 Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (now 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1964)).
Compare Article of War 2(d), Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1, 39 Stat. 651
with UCMJ arts. 2(10)-(11), 10 U.S.C. §802 (10)-(11).
20 See note 9 supra.
2 1UCMJ art. 2(11), 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1964) provides:
Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may
be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with,
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and
outside the following: the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands [are subject to trial by court martial].
22 E.g., the fifth amendment expressly exempts "cases arising in the land or
naval forces... " This exception has been extended by implication to the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942) ; Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). Furthermore, the array of safeguards
provided in article III are not constitutionally required of military courts.
2 Originally the Supreme Court had allowed court-martial jurisdiction over
civilians in peacetime. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956); Kinsella v. Krueger,
351 U.S. 470 (1956). However, a rehearing was granted in both of these habeas
corpus cases and subsequently the Court held that courts-martial could not consti-
tutionally try civilian dependents charged with capital crimes in time of peace.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Less than three years later this holding was
expanded to include non-capital offenses. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single-
ton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960). It was further extended to cover capital crimes com-
mitted by civilian employees of the armed forces in time of peace. Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960). Finally it was extended to cover non-capital crimes
committed by civilian employees. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo,
361 U.S. 281 (1960). These were all habeas corpus proceedings. For a concise
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diction under article 2(11) is void. Thus, if jurisdiction is to be obtained
over civilians, it must be based on article 2 (10), the wartime jurisdictional
provision. In spite of their disapproval of subjecting civilians to military
justice, the courts have long recognized that wartime conditions warrant
some restriction of civilian rights.2" Traditionally, jurisdiction in such
cases has been based constitutionally not upon article I, section 8, clause
14 as was peacetime jurisdiction, but rather upon Congress' broader "war
powers"25 and has repeatedly been upheld as constitutional. 6 Indeed,
Justice Black, recognizing Congress' broad "war powers" and the court-
martial jurisdiction which coincides with these powers, wrote in Reid v.
Covert: "We believe that Article 2(10) sets forth the maximum his-
torically recognized extent of military jurisdiction over civilians under
the concept of 'in the field.' "27 Circuit Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger
also recognized such wartime jurisdiction and expressed the view that
"[w]ithout doubt military jurisdiction over essential civilian employees
at overseas bases would be sustained in wartime."2 8
Since none of the cases striking down court-martial jurisdiction over
civilians in peacetime directly affected the traditional wartime jurisdic-
tion, the Army in Averette based jurisdiction on article 2(10). Before
a civilian is amenable to court-martial under article 2(10) the three con-
ditions of the provision must be met: the civilian must be (1) "serving
with or accompanying an armed force" (2) "in the field" (3) during a
"time of war." Thus the court in Averette, by holding that "war" means
a war formally declared by Congress, found that the third condition was
not met and further restricted military jurisdiction over civilians.
Chief Judge Quinn, dissenting in Averette,"9 noted that a federal
district court in Kansas had earlier expressly rejected this view in denying
discussion of the rise and fall of military jurisdiction over civilians in time of
peace see WIENER app. IV.
" Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957).
"5 The "war powers" stem from article I, section 8, of the Constitution which
gives Congress the power "[tlo make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper . . . [to] provide for the common Defence . . . declare War . . . raise
and support Armies... provide and maintain a Navy... [and] provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union ... and repel Invasions. .. "
0 Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 327
U.S. 777 (1946), disnissed as moot, 3.28 U.S. 822 (1946); Hines v. Mikell, 259
F. 28 (4th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 (1919).
354 U.S. 1, 34 n.61 (1957).
8United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (dissenting opinion).
20 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 366, 41 C.M.R. at
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Averette habeas corpus relief.8" A survey of the case law dealing with the
interpretation of the words "in time of war" as used in a military sense
lends support to Chief Judge Quinn's view that a formal declaration of war
is not a prerequisite for the exercise of article 2(10) jurisdiction.8'
Also, the Supreme Court in 1800 declared that hostilities between the
French and American naval forces were "war" notwithstanding the
absence of a formal declaration by Congress. 2 The test enunciated was
whether Congress had authorized the hostilities, not whether Congress
had declared war. Furthermore, war in the context of every American
military code has consistently been interpreted by the courts to include
undeclared wars. 4 Thus the Indian wars of the nineteenth century
constituted war 5 as did the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.0 The Court of
Military Appeals itself previously followed this reasoning by observing
that both the Korean 7 and Vietnamese"' conflicts fell within "a time of
war." Thus, arguably, the court had ample precedent to hold that the
Vietnamese conflict constituted "a time of war."
Indeed, Chief Judge Quinn noted that less than three years earlier the
Court of Military Appeals in Latney v. Ignatius"' rejected a contention
"that court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(10) depended upon a
specific declaration of war by Congress." 40 Latney is particularly sig-
nificant because it, like Averette, is concerned with article 2(10) juris-
diction over a civilian in Vietnam. Considering the fact that Latney was
" Averette v. Dillon, Civil No. L-863 (D. Kan., filed Jul. 24, 1969).
1 See, e.g., Wiener, Courts Martial for Civilians Accompanying the Arined
Forces in Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24 (1968) and the cases cited therein.
82 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
*' Id. at 43-44.
"
4Wiener, Courts Martial for Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in
Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24 (1968).
" Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
"* Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 F. 445 (C.C.D. Kan. 1905).8
7See, e.g., United States v. Shell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 23 C.M.R. 110 (1957);
United States v. Sanders, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 21, 21 C.M.R. 147 (1956); United States
v. Ayers, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954); United States v. Bancroft, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
"8 United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968). How-
ever, it must be pointed out that in Averette the Court of Military Appeals spe-
cifically mentioned this case and those cited in note 37 supra and noted that none
concerned subjecting a civilian to military trial, but rather dealt with other pro-
visions of the Code and affected defendants who were soldiers and thus already amen-
able to trial by court-martial. But see United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776,
787, 21 C.M.R. 98, 109 (1965).
8817 U.S.C.M.A. 677 (1967).
10 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 366, 41 C.M.R. at -.
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only negligibly connected with the military, it seems anomalous that when
presented with Averette, in which the accused was intricately connected
with the military, the court would disregard its former decision and re-
quire, for the first time, a formal declaration of war by Congress.
However, within two years after Latney was decided, two significant
developments occurred which undoubtedly influenced the Court of Military
Appeals: O'Callahan v. Parker4 was decided by the Supreme Court and
four weeks later, Latney was granted habeas corpus relief in the federal
courts.42 Although it is by no means evident from the opinion itself that
the Court of Military Appeals in Averette relied on O'Callahan and its
interpretation in Latney, the court did state that "[a] s a result of the
most recent guidance in this area from the Supreme Court we believe
that a strict and literal construction of the phrase 'in time of war' should
be applied." 3 As O'Callahan is the only significant Supreme Court
decision "in this area" handed down between the time that Latney and
Averette were decided by the Court of Military Appeals, it must be
assumed that the court was referring to O'Callahan.
Although O'Callahan was concerned with military jurisdiction over
a serviceman within the territorial limits of the United States in time of
peace,44 it arguably has some effect on court-martial jurisdiction over
civilians such as Averette. The O'Callahan decision drastically limited
traditional military jurisdiction by requiring, inter alia, that the offense
be "service-connected" before military jurisdiction can be exercised.45
In O'Callahan Justice Douglas commenting upon the Reid-Singleton-
Grisham-McElroy line of cases46 wrote that "[t]hese cases decide that
courts-martial have no jurisdiction to try those who are not members of
the Armed Forces, no matter how intimate the connection between their
offense and the concerns of military discipline." 47 Although the circuit
court in Latney noted that Justice Douglas failed to mention that "these
cases" dealt solely with peacetime jurisdiction under article 2(11), not
wartime jurisdiction under article 2(10), it felt that
"395 U.S. 258 (1969).
,Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
19 U.S.C.M.A. at 365, 41 C.M.R. at-.
"395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969).
"Id. For a concise discussion of the O'Callahan case see Note, Military Law-
Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial to Try Servicemen for Civilian Offenses, 48 N.C.L.
REv. 380 (1970).
,See cases cited note 23 supra.
"395 U.S. 258, 267 (1969) (dictum).
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[i]t is fair to conclude that the spirit of O'Callahan, and of the other
Supreme Court precedents there reviewed, precludes an expansive
view of Article 2(10) ... even assuming as we do that this is a time
of undeclared war which permits some invocation of the war power
under which Article 2(10) was enacted. We think Article 2(10) may
not be read so expansively as to reach this civilian seaman, employed by
a private shipping company, and in no closer physical proximity or dura-
tion to the armed forces than a seaman in port for a short period, living
on his ship and under the discipline of his civilian captain while waiting
for it to turn around, not assimilated to any military personnel in
terms of living quarters or conditions, who had been arrested for a
[non service-connected] crime committed in a bar frequented by
civilians in port.48
Thus it can be seen that the federal court in Latney did not feel that
O'Callahan demanded a "strict and literal construction of the phrase
'in time of war'" as did Averette. Instead, the court interpreted O'Calla-
han as intimating that before article 2(10) jurisdiction can be con-
stitutionally applied the military must first show an intimate connection
between the military and the accused. Such an analysis shifts the em-
phasis from the "time of war" requirement to more relevant policy con-
siderations, and suggests a more pragmatic approach than that used in
Averette for determining the jurisdictional bounds of article 2(10). The
better approach would seem to require that three conditions coexist in
order for jurisdiction under article 2(10) to vest in a time of undeclared
war: (1) that there be an intimate connection between the accused and the
military; (2) that the offense be service-connected in the sense that it in
some way significantly affects military authority, security, or property;
and (3) that the traditional broad view of "in the field' 49 be limited to
the area of actual hostilities.
Such an approach appears to be warranted and can be supported by
• 416 F.2d at 823 (emphasis added).
"Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 (1919).
The court, distinguishing "in the field" from "in the theater of operations," observed
that the question of whether or not an armed force is "in the field" "is not to be
determined by the locality in which the army may be found, but rather by the activity
in which it may be engaged at any particular time." Id. at 34. The court thus
found that a stenographer employed by the Army at a temporary training camp
in the United States was "in the field" during World War I. Similarly, a merchant
ship and crew have been held to be "in the field." McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F.
Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943); Ex parte Gerlach, 247 F. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). See




precedent. As was noted the existence of war in the context of all military
codes has been determined by the realities of the situation, not by the
presence of a formal declaration by Congress. Secondly, while recog-
nizing the constitutional power of Congress to provide for wartime military
jurisdiction over civilians, the Court in Reid seemed to call for a restriction
of this jurisdiction to the actual area of hostilities by stating that "[t] he
exigencies which have required military rule on the battlefront are not
present in areas where no conflict exists."' 0 Finally, the general spirit of
the Reid line of cases and the further limit placed on court-martial juris-
diction by O'Callahan would appear to require a direct and intimate
connection between the military, the accused, and the crime.
The suggested analysis necessitates an examination of the underlying
policy considerations and a balancing of the competing interests of the
individual and the military. Obviously, the purpose behind article 2(10)
is to insure that the military effectively functions under wartime conditions
with a minimum of interference from its civilian component. In an area
of actual hostilities, military commanders should have adequate powers to
swiftly and effectively deal with those-both civilians and servicemen-
who significantly threaten the morale, discipline, or security of American
personnel in the war zone. In a situation such as Vietnam the necessity of
article 2(10) jurisdiction is vividly portrayed. The combat readiness of
our troops, and hence the lives of many Americans, can be severely
jeopardized if the military has no effective means of dealing with such
problems as the sale of illegal drugs, prostitution, blackmarket operations,
unauthorized dealings with the enemy, and numerous petty crimes.5'
Such crimes are more easily perpetrated by those who are directly con-
nected with the military operations. A trial by a civil court, if available,
does not provide the swift discipline and strong deterrence necessary to
the military effort.
An additional consideration-that of the "jurisdictional gap"-is
also pertinent here. While it is constitutionally permissible to try citizens
in a United States court for crimes committed outside the territorial limits
" Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957). The Court also declared that "[f]rom
a time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary circumstances
present in an area of actual fighting have been considered sufficient to permit pun-
ishment of some civilians in that area by military courts under military rules." Id.
at 33 (emphasis added).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 798-800, 21 C.M.R. 98,
120-22 (1956).
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of the United States,52 generally, only crimes against the Government are
cognizable.13 On the other hand, extraterritorial crimes against private
individuals or their property (i.e., assault, murder, and larceny) are not
cognizable in federal courts. 4 Fortunately, a crime such as Averette's
would be triable in a United States district court although such a trial
would be plagued with lack of power to compel the attendance of foreign
witnesses, tremendous expense, and fantastic waste.15 However, in
Averette the court's "time of war" holding was not limited to such
offenses, and apparently would apply to murder abroad and numerous other
crimes not triable in the United States courts. For such offenses the only
acceptable alternative may well be to turn the accused over to the appro-
priate foreign government where he would enjoy no United States con-
stitutional rights, hoping that the foreign government will be interested
enough to prosecute, yet detached enough to give a fair trial.
Of necessity military trials do not provide the full array of con-
stitutional safeguards that are inherent in the article III courts. However,
the exigencies of wartime justify some restrictions on the rights of
civilians who are intimately connected with the military operation. In-
deed, this is the central idea behind the constitutional provisions for special
war powers. The "formal declaration test" set forth by the Court of
Military Appeals, while providing an objective test for determining at
what point jurisdiction vests, ignores both the rationale for such juris-
diction, and the fact of modern international life that most shooting wars
rage on without de jure declaration. The proposed test is more flexible
and would require the court to look at underlying policy considerations.
It does not indiscriminately include or exclude a civilian. Unwarranted
encroachment upon the civilian's constitutional rights is protected, but if
the needs of national military policy are adequately shown then juris-
diction vests.
THOMAS R. CRAWFORD
52U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1964).
"United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
" Id. at 98.
u See, e.g., United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 802-03, 21 C.M.R. 98,
124-25 (1956).
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